








































The Effect of Disability Insurance 
Receipt on Labor Supply 
 







July 1, 2011 
 
WP 2009-05 
 The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on
Labor Supply
Eric French and Jae Song∗
July 1, 2011
Abstract
This paper estimates the eﬀect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. We
ﬁnd that beneﬁt receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage points three
years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller for those
over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. Estimates are not sensitive
to accounting for the fact that those allowed beneﬁts are diﬀerent than those who are
denied. However, estimates are sensitive to accounting for the fact that many individuals
who are initially denied are later allowed. The participation elasticity with respect to the
after-tax wage is 1.5.
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11 Introduction
This paper presents new evidence on the eﬀect of Disability Insurance (DI) receipt on
labor supply. We compare the earnings patterns of individuals who applied for and received
disability insurance beneﬁts to the earnings patterns of those who applied for beneﬁts but
were denied.
Relative to Bound’s (1989) classic study on earnings of rejected DI applicants, we make
the following key improvement. We address the fact that those who are denied beneﬁts are
potentially diﬀerent than those who are allowed. Using Social Security administrative data,
we exploit the assignment of DI cases to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), an assignment
which is essentially random. We document large diﬀerences in allowance rates across judges,
and show that these diﬀerences are unrelated to the health or earnings potential of DI ap-
plicants. Using instrumental variables procedures, we use judge speciﬁc allowance rates to
predict allowance of individual cases. We then use predicted allowance to estimate the eﬀect
of allowance on labor supply.
We ﬁnd that three years after assignment to an ALJ, DI beneﬁt allowance reduces earnings
$4,059 per year and labor force participation 26 percentage points. As it turns out, our
estimates are not very sensitive to accounting for the fact that those who are denied beneﬁts
are potentially diﬀerent than those who are allowed: instrumental variables estimates are very
close to OLS estimates. These estimates imply a high labor supply elasticity with respect to
the after-tax wage. The earnings and participation elasticities are 1.8 and 1.5, respectively.
However, many initially-denied DI applicants appeal the denial or re-apply. In fact, we
ﬁnd that 50% of applicants who are denied beneﬁts by an ALJ are eventually allowed beneﬁts
within ﬁve years. During the appeal process, these applicants tend not to work, even though
they are currently not receiving beneﬁts. This has an important eﬀect on our estimated
eﬀects. When we measure earnings and DI beneﬁt allowance ﬁve years after assignment to
an ALJ, rather than three, we ﬁnd that DI allowance reduces earnings $4,915 per year, rather
than $4,059.
Furthermore, we estimate labor supply responses for diﬀerent subgroups of the population.
We identify many subgroups of the population whose labor supply is not sensitive to beneﬁt
receipt, such as those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. Because
we have the population of DI applicants, we obtain precise estimates of the labor supply
2responses, even for these narrow subgroups of the population.
Using a Marginal Treatment Eﬀects approach, we ﬁnd that marginal applicants handled
by stricter judges (who allow beneﬁts to relatively few applicants) have similar labor supply
responses to those handled by lenient judges. This is consistent with the view that the
marginal applicant handled by a strict judge is as physically unable to work as the marginal
case handled by a more lenient judge.
Section 2 gives a literature review, section 3 describes the DI system, section 4 describes
our estimation methods, section 5 shows data, section 6 reports estimates, and section 7
concludes.
2 Literature Review
Disability Insurance is one of America’s largest social insurance programs. In 2005, 4.1%
of men ages 25-64 were receiving disability insurance beneﬁts. The total cost of the program
was $85.4 billion, making it more costly than unemployment insurance. Furthermore, after
two years on the disability rolls, individuals become eligible for Medicare beneﬁts. The total
cost of Medicare payments to DI beneﬁciaries was $49 billion in 2005 (Autor and Duggan
2006).
DI has often been cited as one of the main causes of the fall in labor supply of American
men aged 55-64. In order to better understand the labor supply eﬀects of DI, Bound (1989)
compared earnings patterns of individuals who applied for and received DI beneﬁts to those
who applied for beneﬁts but were denied. He found that those who were allowed beneﬁts
were less likely to work than those who were rejected, but the eﬀect was modest. Even those
who were denied beneﬁts had participation rates of less than 50% after denial of beneﬁts.
Thus, Bound inferred that at most 50% of rejected male applicants during the 1970s would
have worked were it not for the availability of disability beneﬁts. These estimates imply that
DI is responsible for well under half of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 55-64.
Von Watcher et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the patterns documented by Bound have changed little
over time.
Parsons (1991) and Bound (1989, 1991) discuss three key criticisms of Bound’s approach.
First, those who are denied beneﬁts are diﬀerent than those who are allowed beneﬁts. Bound’s
claim was that this should lead to an overstatement of the eﬀect of disability on labor supply,
3because those who are denied are on average healthier than those who are allowed. However,
Lahiri et al. (2008) found that those who are denied beneﬁts tend to have very intermittent
work histories. Those who are allowed beneﬁts are more likely to work and have higher
earnings before applying for beneﬁts. Thus it is not clear whether those who are denied are
more or less likely to work in the absence of beneﬁts.
It is this problem that our study addresses. Our identiﬁcation approach compares those
who are denied beneﬁts to those who are otherwise similar but are allowed beneﬁts. Our
approach compliments the approach of Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008) who exploit the
vocational grid. They use the fact that in many cases, an individual aged 54 applying for
beneﬁts would be denied, although the same individual at age 55 would be allowed. Our
estimated labor supply eﬀects are similar to Chen and Van der Klaauw (2008). However, we
add to their analysis by providing larger sample sizes. This allows for more precise estimates.
It also allows us to document how the responsiveness of labor supply varies with demographics,
because we can obtain precise estimates for narrow subgroups. Our estimated eﬀects are also
similar to Maestas et al. (2011), who use assignment of disability examiners at the initial
stage of the DI application process as a source of variation in allowance rates. The advantage
of our study relative to theirs is that judges are assigned to cases on a rotational basis,
which makes the assignment process random for all practical purposes, whereas examiners
at the initial stage may specialize. Thus our source of variation is more clearly exogenous.
Furthermore, our data includes earnings and the share of individuals who are allowed or are
appealing up to 10 years after the ALJ allowance decision, whereas they have data only on
earnings and the share working, and only up to three years after an initial allowance decision.
This is important because we ﬁnd that 40% of those not allowed beneﬁts three years after an
assignment to an ALJ are allowed beneﬁts within 10 years of assignment.
Our paper, Van der Klaauw (2008) and Maestas et al. (2011) all obtain identiﬁcation
at diﬀerent stages of the adjudication process, and thus our estimated eﬀects correspond to
diﬀerent pools of applicants. Thus the three studies are of independent interest. For example,
the disparities in allowance rates across judges has received a great deal of attention in policy
circles (Social Security Advisory Board, 2006), legal studies (Taylor, 2007), and the popular
press (Paletta, 2011). Despite the diﬀerences between our paper, Chen and Van der Klaauw
(2008), and Maestas et al. (2011), all three papers produce similar results and reinforce each
4other’s ﬁndings.
The second criticism of Bound’s approach is that many individuals who are denied con-
tinue to appeal the denial. In order to be deemed eligible for beneﬁts, the individual cannot
work while appealing the initial denial. Thus, many of those who are denied do not work
in order to increase the chances of successful appeal. If the option to appeal had not ex-
isted, more of these individuals might have returned to the labor force. We partly address
this problem by estimating the labor supply response to whether the individual was allowed
beneﬁts three years after assignment to a judge, although we show that many re-apply and
appeal well after three years. We provide new evidence on the share of denied individuals
who appeal and subsequently receive beneﬁts.1
Third, in order to apply for beneﬁts, the individual must be out of the labor force for
a period of time. For example, the individual can only work a very limited amount in the
ﬁve months before applying for beneﬁts. During that period, human capital may depreciate.
Thus the individual may not be able to return to her previous job, even if she is healthy. In
other words, the very act of applying for beneﬁts reduces ability to work. Our study does
not address this issue.
3 The Disability Insurance System
This section shows that that the DI application process is high stakes: DI beneﬁts are
worth about $200,000 to a typical beneﬁciary if they maintain low earnings. Those allowed
beneﬁts face strong work disincentives. Those denied beneﬁts face strong incentives to re-
apply and appeal. Judges who make allowance decisions are for all practical purposes ran-
domly assigned to cases. Judicial independence means that judges have a great deal of
latitude to determine eligibility (Taylor, 2007), and as a result judges can have very diﬀerent
allowance rates.
3.1 Labor Supply Incentives
Both income eﬀects (through the high replacement rate) and substitution eﬀects (beneﬁ-
ciaries will lose beneﬁts if they earn above the SGA amount) indicate that DI should reduce
1Understanding subsequent allowance and appeal is also an important input into dynamic models of DI
application and receipt, such as Bound et al. (2010), Benitez-Silva et al. (2011), Low and Pistaferri (2011).
5labor supply. If an applicant is allowed DI beneﬁts, the dollar amount of beneﬁts depends
on previous labor earnings. Disabled worker beneﬁts averaged $1,004 per month among DI
beneﬁciaries in 2007 (Social Security Administration, 2008). Because the beneﬁt schedule is
progressive, disability beneﬁts replace 60% and 40% of labor income for those at the 10th and
50th percentile of the earnings distribution, respectively (Autor and Duggan 2006). Those
receiving beneﬁts can earn up to the Substantial Gainful Activity level (SGA), which was
$500 per month (in current dollars) during the 1990s and $900 per month in 2007. Those
earning more than this amount for more than a nine month Trial Work Period lose their
beneﬁts.
Furthermore, DI beneﬁts likely reduce labor supply through a third channel – Medicare
eligibility. Individuals receiving DI beneﬁts are eligible for Medicare after a two year waiting
period. Medicare largely eliminates the value of employer-provided health insurance. For
those working at a ﬁrms providing health insurance, Medicare eliminates an important work
incentive (French and Jones, 2011).
Disabled individuals with especially weak earnings histories and low asset levels are eligible
for a related program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI beneﬁts are not a
function of previous labor income. The Federal Maximum SSI beneﬁt level was $386 per
month in 1990 and $623 in 2007. Some states supplement this beneﬁt. Beneﬁts are reduced
by 50 cents for every dollar of labor income. Individuals drawing SSI may also be immediately
eligible for Medicaid, the government provided health insurance program for the poor. Many
people draw both DI and SSI beneﬁts concurrently.
Relatively few people lose disability beneﬁts for reasons other than death.2 For example,
of 7.1 million individuals (DI worker beneﬁciaries) drawing DI beneﬁts in 2007, 0.5% had
beneﬁts terminated because they earned above the SGA level for an extended period of time
in 2007. Another 0.3% had beneﬁts terminated because they were deemed medically able
to work after a continuing disability review, which is a periodic review of the health of DI
beneﬁciaries (Social Security Administration, 2007).
The disability allowance decision is high stakes. If the individual is allowed beneﬁts, that
individual is typically given disability beneﬁts until the normal retirement age (age 65 during
the 1990s and now 66), when these beneﬁts are converted into Social Security beneﬁts. Thus
2DI beneﬁts are converted into retiree beneﬁts once the beneﬁciary turns the normal retirement age. The
statistics above are for DI beneﬁts before the conversion to retiree beneﬁts.
6a 52 1
2 year old receiving $12,000 in annual disability beneﬁts will likely receive these beneﬁts
for 12 1
2 years, meaning that she will receive $150,000 in transfers. Furthermore, two years
after receiving beneﬁts, she will receive Medicare beneﬁts, which are worth at least $50,000.
Thus, being allowed beneﬁts is worth on average $200,000 over a lifetime.
3.2 Determining Eligibility for DI beneﬁts
An individual is deemed eligible for beneﬁts if they have met certain work requirements
and if they are deemed medically disabled. Although the exact algorithm is complex (see Hu
et al. 2001, Benitez-Silva et al. 1999, for details), one of two conditions must be met for the
individual to be deemed disabled.
The ﬁrst condition is “listed impairment”. Individuals that meet one of over 100 speciﬁc
listed impairments are given immediate beneﬁts. Examples include statutory blindness (i.e.,
corrected vision of 20/200 or worse in the better eye) and multiple sclerosis.
The second condition is inability to perform either past work or other work. This condition
involves a combination of medical impairment and vocational factors such as education, work
experience, and age. These cases can be especially diﬃcult to evaluate. Myers (1993), a
former Social Security Administration Deputy Commissioner, points out that “if a worker has
a disability so severe that he or she can do only sedentary work, then disability is presumed
in the case where the person is aged 55 and older, has less than a high school education,
and has worked only in unskilled jobs, but this is not so presumed in the case of a similar
young worker. Clearly, borderline cases arise frequently and are diﬃcult to adjudicate in an
equitable manner!”
The disability determination process is a multi-step process. Figure 1 shows the share of
applicants who are allowed at diﬀerent steps during our sample period (described in detail in
Section 4 and Appendix A). After an initial waiting period of ﬁve months, DI applicants have
their case reviewed by a Disability Determination Service review board. Figure 1 shows that
39% of applicants are allowed and 61% are denied at this stage. At this stage the most clear-
cut cases are allowed, such as those with a listed impairment. Cases that are more diﬃcult to
judge (such as mental and musculoskeletal problems) are usually denied at this stage. About
half of all applicants denied for medical reasons appeal at the disability determination service


































Figure 1: Allowance at different stages of the applications and appeals pro-
cess.
(Social Security Administration, 2008). Sixty days after the disability determination service
decision, a DI appeal can be requested. DI appeals are reviewed in court by Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs) after a delay of about one year.3 14% of all initial claims, or 59% of all
claims that are appealed, are allowed at the ALJ level.4 If the case is denied at the ALJ level,
the applicant can then appeal to the Appeals Council level. If the applicant is denied at this
level, she can then appeal after 60 days at the Federal Court level. However, Figure 1 shows
that appeals at the higher levels are rarely successful: less than 2% of all initial claimants
receive beneﬁts at the Appeals Council or Federal Court level. Lastly, denied applicants can
end their appeal and re-apply for beneﬁts. The last line on Figure 1 includes those who re-
apply for beneﬁts. Another 7% of all initial claims are eventually allowed beneﬁts through a
re-application. 33% do not get beneﬁts at any stage after 10 years. Figure A1 in the appendix
shows that most who do not get beneﬁts after a few years end their appeals. However, 10
years after initially claiming, 6% are still in the process of appealing or re-applying.
Because we identify the causal eﬀect of DI on labor supply using variation at the ALJ
level, the estimated eﬀect applies only to marginal cases. The least healthy individuals, such
3Judges can make one of three decisions: allowed, denied, or remand. A “remand” is a request for more
information from the disability determination service. Our measure of “allowed” is the ﬁnal determination at
the ALJ stage, and thus includes the ﬁnal decision on remands.
4The full allowance rate at this stage is slightly higher than 59%. Our 59% allowance rate is for our
estimation sample, which drops pre-reviewed cases that have higher allowance rates. See footnote 7.
8as those with listed impairments, are allowed at the Disability Determination Service stage.
The healthiest individuals will be denied by every judge and will be denied on every appeal.
Thus our results may not be fully generalizable to all DI applicants. However, these marginal
cases are of great interest, because these are the individuals most likely to be aﬀected by
changes in the leniency of the appeals level of the DI system.
3.3 Assignment of DI cases to judges
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are assigned to appeals cases on a rotational basis,
with the oldest cases receiving priority at each hearing oﬃce.5 Thus, the oldest case is given
to the judge who most recently ﬁnished a case. Therefore, conditional on applying at a given
oﬃce at a given point in time, the initial assignment of cases to judges is “essentially random”
(Social Security Advisory Board, 2006). Judges do not get to pick the cases they handle.
Judges are not assigned cases based on the expertise of the judge. Furthermore, an individual
cannot choose an alternate judge after being assigned a judge.
The initially assigned judge is the same as the deciding judge in 96% of all cases. Although
the deciding judge is not necessarily randomly assigned, the initially assigned judge is.6 We
use the initial assignment to a judge as our source of exogenous variation.
5Title 5, Part III, Subpart B, Chapter 31, Subchapter I, Section 3105 of the US Code states that “Admin-
istrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable” (United States, 2007). The
Social Security Administration’s Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) Volume I Chapter
2 Section 1-55 states that “the Hearing Oﬃce Chief Administrative Law Judge generally assigns cases to ALJs
from the master docket on a rotational basis, with the earliest (i.e., oldest) Request for Hearing receiving
priority.” (Social Security Administration, 2009). HALLEX gives 11 exceptions to this rule. For example, the
exceptions include “critical cases”, such as individuals with terminal conditions and military service personnel,
as well as remand cases. These cases are expedited and reviewed by Senior Attorneys. If there is a clear cut
decision to be made, then the Senior Attorney will make the decision without a hearing. If the case is not
clear cut, then the case is put back in the master docket and is assigned to a judge in rotation. Fortunately
we can identify cases that were decided without a hearing and we delete them from our sample. Our analysis
focuses on the remaining cases where there was a hearing.
6The initially assigned judge is not necessarily the judge who handles the case. This fact can potentially
be exploited by DI claimants. For example, if an individual misses her court case, she may be reassigned to a
diﬀerent judge. Another possibility is that for some cases in remote areas, cases are held via video conference
where the judge and claimant are not in the same room. Claimants can demand that the judge be present
at a hearing, and thus the judge must travel to the claimant. Some judges refuse to travel, and thus another
judge will be reassigned to the case. In this way, an individual can potentially reject a judge.
94 Methods
In order to estimate the eﬀect of DI allowance on earnings and labor force participation,
we use a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step we generate an instrumental variable that
is a measure of judge leniency. Conditional on the hearing oﬃce and time, this variable
is correlated with the probability of allowance, but is uncorrelated with health, ability, or
preferences for work. In the second step we use instrumental variables procedures to estimate
the eﬀect of DI on earnings and participation.
4.1 Model
We model allowance using the latent index framework
Ai = 1{g(Zi) − Vi > 0} (1)
where Ai is a 0-1 indicator =1 if individual i is allowed beneﬁts, 1{.} is the indicator function,
Zi = (ji,Xi), ji is a full set of judge indicator variables equal to 1 if the judge heard individual
i’s case, and Xi is a full set of hearing oﬃce-day indicators (equal 1 if individual i’s case is
assigned to that hearing oﬃce-day pair). The residual Vi can be thought of as the lack
of severity of disability observed by the judge (but not by the econometrician). Equation
(1) implies that all judges observe the same signal of disability Vi but diﬀer in the level of
severity necessary to be allowed beneﬁts g(Zi), which is a measure of leniency. Allowance
rates diﬀer across judges only because judges diﬀer in leniency. Equation (1) implies that a
case allowed by a strict judge will always be allowed by a lenient one. This is the monotonicity
assumption of Imbens and Angrist (1994). We assume that P(Zi) ≡ Pr(Ai = 1|Zi) is a non-
trivial function of Zi (i.e., the instrument causes variation in allowance rates), sometimes
known as the rank or existence condition. Lastly, we assume Vi is independent of ji and Xi,
sometimes called the independence assumption.
If judges are randomly assigned to cases, conditional on date and hearing oﬃce, as-
signment satisﬁes the independence assumption. If judges diﬀer only in leniency, then the
monotonicity assumption is satisﬁed. If diﬀerent judges have diﬀerent allowance rates, then
the rank condition holds. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 provide evidence on the extent to which the
independence, monotonicity, and rank assumptions hold.
10Equation (1) is not identiﬁed because a monotonic transformation of both g(.) and V
delivers the same choice probabilities. As a normalization, we assume that Vi is distributed
uniformly. Furthermore, as a functional form assumption we assume that g(.) is linear in ji
and Xi so that we can estimate equation (1) using the regression function
Ai = jiγ1 + Xiδ1 + ei. (2)
To parameterize the eﬀect of allowance on participation and earnings, we adopt the ran-
dom coeﬃcients model of Bjorklund and Moﬃtt (1987):
yi = Aiφi + Xiδy + ui. (3)
where yi is either earnings or participation. We allow for heterogeneity in the parameter φi
to capture heterogeneity in the eﬀect of beneﬁt receipt on earnings. We allow the variables
ui and φi to be potentially correlated with Ai, and with each other.7
4.2 Estimating Equations
We have 1,497 judges in our sample, each of whom is a potential instrument. IV estimators
can suﬀer from small sample bias when both the number of instruments and the number of
observations is large (e.g., Hausman et al. (2009)). In order to address the small sample
bias issue while allowing for the ﬂexible error speciﬁcation in equation (3), our estimation
procedure is as follows.
First, for every observation i in our sample, we estimate equation (2), leaving out obser-
vation i, as in a jackknife estimator. We deﬁne the estimated value of γ1 from this procedure
as ˆ γ1,−i. Because we remove observation i, the estimated parameter ˆ γ1,−i is independent of
ei or ui, even in a small sample. The instrumental variable is jiˆ γ1,−i.
Second, we estimate the equation
Ai = θjiˆ γ1,−i + XiδA + ǫi (4)
7The residual ui is potentially correlated with Ai because those allowed beneﬁts potentially have low
earnings potential. Furthermore, φi is potentially correlated with Ai because more disabled people are unlikely
to work, even when they get the beneﬁt. Finally, ui and φi are potentially correlated with each other since
unhealthy individuals have lower earnings, whether or not they are allowed beneﬁts.
11as well as equation (3) jointly using two stage least squares. Given the above assumptions,
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and French and Taber (2010) point out that this proce-
dure identiﬁes a weighted average of φi for the set of individuals aﬀected by the instrument.
We have over 500,000 hearing oﬃce-day interactions as in the covariate set Xi, so directly
estimating equations (2), (3), and (4) is not computationally feasible. Thus we take deviations
from Xi for all variables and estimate (2), (3), and (4) where all variables are deviations from
hearing-oﬃce day means. The procedure is described in appendix C. The judge eﬀect (i.e.,
γ1 vector) is the diﬀerence between the probability that a judge allows a case and the average
allowance rate at that judge’s hearing oﬃce, conditional on the day. Below we refer to this
object as the judge allowance diﬀerential.
4.3 Marginal Treatment Eﬀects
Section 6.6 presents estimated Marginal Treatment Eﬀects (MTEs), which is the par-
ticipation or earnings response for the individuals whose allowance decision is aﬀected by
changing the instrument. We estimate the equations
Ai = f(jiˆ γ1,−i) + XiδAM + ηi, (5)
yi = K(\ P(Zi)) + XiδyM +  i (6)
where \ P(Zi) is the predicted value of Ai from equation (5). As shown by Heckman, Urzua,
and Vytlacil (2006) and French and Taber (2010), as well as appendix C, the MTE is
K′(p) = E[φi|Xi = x,Vi = p] (7)
where p is a particular value of P(Zi). This value of p can also be interpreted as the (lack of)
judge-observed severity of the case Vi. As P(Zi) increases, the instrument aﬀects individuals
with lower levels of severity. We estimate ˆ γ1,−i from equation (2) as before, then estimate
equations (5) and (6), allowing the functions f(.) and K(.) to be polynomials. Heckman et
al. (2006) experiment with diﬀerent approaches to estimating the MTE. They ﬁnd that the
polynomial approach works about as well as other procedures. Our Monte Carlo simulations
suggest there is very little bias when using polynomials and observed sample characteristics,
12such as number of cases and number of judges. Furthermore, the polynomial procedure is
computationally feasible when allowing for large numbers of covariates.
4.4 Identifying Levels
The estimation procedure described in section 4.2 identiﬁes the change in earnings or
participation caused by DI receipt. To obtain the level, note that the law of total probability
gives
E[yi] = E[yi|Ai = 1]Pr[Ai = 1] + E[yi|Ai = 0]Pr[Ai = 0] (8)
Furthermore, equation (3) shows that
E[φi] = E[yi|Ai = 1] − E[yi|Ai = 0] (9)
Using equations (8) and (9) we can solve for the two unknowns:
E[yi|Ai = 1] = E[yi] + E[φi]Pr[Ai = 1] (10)
E[yi|Ai = 0] = E[yi] − E[φi]Pr[Ai = 0]. (11)
We can identify E[yi], Pr[Ai = 1],Pr[Ai = 0] directly from the data. Our estimation proce-
dure delivers E[φi] for cases who are aﬀected by our instrument. Assuming that E[φi] for
those aﬀected by the instrument is the same as E[φi] for those not aﬀected by the instru-
ment yields estimates of E[yi|Ai = 1] and E[yi|Ai = 0] for the full sample. This assumption
is untestable, although section 6.6 gives evidence that E[φi] does not vary much over the
support of our data.
5 Data
Our initial sample is the universe of individuals who appealed either a DI or SSI bene-
ﬁt denial, and were assigned to an ALJ during the years 1990-1999. Using Social Security
Numbers, we match together data from the SSA 831 ﬁle, the Oﬃce of Hearings and Ap-
peals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing Oﬃce Tracking System (HOTS), the
Appeals Council Automated Processing System (ACAPS), the Litigation Overview Tracking
13System (LOTS), the Master Earnings ﬁle (MEF), and the Numerical Identiﬁcation ﬁle (NU-
MIDENT). These data are described in greater detail in the appendix. To the best of our
knowledge, neither the OHACCS, HOTS, ACAPS, nor the LOTS datasets have been used
for research purposes before. We match in earnings, reapplications and appeals data from 11
years prior to 10 years following assignment to a judge. Thus our earnings and appeals data
run from 1979 to 2009.
We drop all observations heard by a judge who heard less than 50 cases during the sample
period. We also drop cases with missing education information. Table A1 in Appendix A
presents more details on sample selection criteria and table A2 presents mean age, race,
earnings histories, and health of individuals in our estimation sample. Our main estimation
sample has 1,779,825 DI cases, heard by 1,497 judges, with a mean allowance rate at the ALJ
stage of 64.5%. Because many of those denied by an ALJ appeal or re-apply for beneﬁts, the
allowance rate three years after assignment is 76.9%. All dollar amounts listed below are in
2006 dollars, deﬂated by the CPI.
6 Results
6.1 Establishing the validity of the randomization
In previous sections we claimed that the assignment of cases to judges is random, con-
ditional on hearing oﬃce and day. Random assignment implies that we cannot predict the
judge using observable characteristics of the judge’s caseload. Table 1 presents tests of this
hypothesis.
First we consider which variables predict allowance. Column 1 of Table 1 presents es-
timates from a regression of an allowance indicator (de-meaned by hearing oﬃce and day)
on the age, race, earnings histories, and health conditions of individuals in our estimation
sample. Women, older individuals, whites, those with strong attachment to the labor market,
high earners, those represented by a lawyer, and those who did not complete high school are
more likely to be allowed beneﬁts. Column 2 presents t − statistics. It shows that these
diﬀerences are highly statistically signiﬁcant. The R2 shows that the covariates explain 3.9%
of the variation in allowance rates.
Our instrumental variable is the judge allowance diﬀerential, jiˆ γ1,−i, de-meaned by hear-
14Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.0290 22.9 0.0002 0.9
45 to 54 0.0484 37.3 -0.0003 -1.3
55 to 59 0.1379 54.5 -0.0005 -1.0
60 or older 0.1476 49.7 -0.0004 -0.6
Black -0.0497 -23.1 0.0001 0.1
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown -0.0215 -7.0 -0.0001 0.0
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2 0.0082 24.9 0.0000 0.1
Average earnings/1,000,000, years -11 to -2 ($2006) 0.9480 10.2 -0.0002 0.0
Represented by lawyer 0.0743 41.8 0.0008 1.0
SSDI -0.0027 -1.7 -0.0004 -0.6
High school graduate, no college -0.0092 -8.8 0.0000 0.0
Some college -0.0292 -17.3 -0.0010 -1.4
College graduate -0.0127 -5.6 -0.0004 -0.5
Mental disorders -0.0124 -4.4 -0.0016 -3.1
Mental retardation -0.0153 -7.7 -0.0016 -2.6
Nervous system -0.0063 -1.9 -0.0008 -0.8
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease)  0.0158 8.6 0.0001 0.2
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.0040 2.3 -0.0006 -1.2
Respiratory system 0.0036 2.4 0.0000 0.0
Injuries  -0.0218 -10.3 -0.0006 -1.0
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.0098 5.3 0.0009 1.9
All other 0.0215 10.3 -0.0003 -0.5
Standard deviation of dependent variable 0.4293 0.0659
R^2 0.0389 0.0002
Notes: variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned.  Standard errors are clustered by judge. 
Omitted category is male, younger than 45, white, not represented by a lawyer, applying for SSI or SSI and DI concurrently, 
not a high school graduate, with a neoplasm (e.g., cancer)





Labor force participation and income
Dependent variable: Allowed
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Number of applicants = 1,779,825, number of judges = 1,497




15Observations Allowance rate Allowance rate Allowance 3 years later Std. Error T-ratio
ALJ stage 3 years later Coeff on judge allowance rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All groups 1,779,825 0.645 0.769 0.764 0.008 101
Male 894,927 0.638 0.763 0.738 0.010 74
Female 884,898 0.652 0.774 0.791 0.009 84
44 or younger 647,528 0.580 0.698 0.898 0.015 60
45 to 54 754,191 0.644 0.783 0.752 0.010 74
55 to 59 245,948 0.755 0.866 0.550 0.016 34
60 or older 132,158 0.762 0.848 0.612 0.023 26
White 416,177 0.673 0.791 0.742 0.008 89
Black 1,154,269 0.586 0.725 0.793 0.015 54
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 209,379 0.608 0.733 0.835 0.019 44
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2<70% 688,194 0.581 0.696 0.914 0.013 73
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2
￿
70% 1,091,631 0.685 0.814 0.668 0.009 72
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)<$10000 919,519 0.587 0.709 0.886 0.011 78
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)
￿
$10000 860,306 0.707 0.833 0.635 0.011 60
Represented by lawyer 1,136,584 0.684 0.802 0.738 0.009 79
Not represented by lawyer 643,241 0.576 0.710 0.802 0.013 62
SSDI 673,444 0.696 0.814 0.680 0.012 57
SSI or Concurrent (both SSDI and SSI) 1,106,381 0.614 0.741 0.817 0.010 80
Less than high school 726,027 0.649 0.776 0.741 0.010 75
High school graduate, no college 771,339 0.647 0.767 0.778 0.010 76
Some college 197,533 0.615 0.738 0.812 0.016 51
College graduate 84,926 0.673 0.786 0.715 0.021 34
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 228,564 0.630 0.740 0.825 0.014 58
Mental disorders 34,436 0.644 0.762 0.698 0.036 19
Mental retardation 272,508 0.591 0.759 0.749 0.018 42
Nervous system 31,336 0.602 0.813 0.578 0.034 17
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease)  99,666 0.658 0.776 0.711 0.021 34
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 191,883 0.670 0.787 0.681 0.015 45
Respiratory system 640,712 0.664 0.776 0.785 0.012 68
Injuries  75,079 0.632 0.760 0.757 0.025 31
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 119,617 0.655 0.748 0.840 0.020 43
All other 86,024 0.661 0.790 0.741 0.022 34
1990 125,293 0.682 0.830 0.549 0.020 28
1991 145,136 0.717 0.842 0.564 0.016 36
1992 170,759 0.719 0.829 0.620 0.015 40
1993 162,315 0.687 0.792 0.736 0.018 40
1994 179,567 0.659 0.758 0.802 0.018 44
1995 197,684 0.629 0.738 0.850 0.016 54
1996 209,342 0.588 0.715 0.872 0.020 44
1997 197,951 0.589 0.723 0.852 0.017 49
1998 202,123 0.608 0.745 0.872 0.015 60
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16ing oﬃce and day. Column 3 presents estimates from a regression of the judge allowance
diﬀerential on covariates. Column 4 provides t − statistics. Of the 22 covariates, two have
coeﬃcients that are statistically diﬀerent than 0 at the 95% level. Sex, age, race, previous
earnings, past labor market participation, an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is a DI
(but not SSI) applicant, an indicator for whether the case is represented by a lawyer, and ed-
ucation all have little explanatory power for whether or not the case was assigned to a lenient
judge. All the estimated coeﬃcients are small in comparison to the coeﬃcients on the same
variables in the allowance equation. The only statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are for men-
tal disorders and mental retardation. Those with mental disorders and mental retardation
are assigned to judges who have 0.16% lower allowance rates than average. These coeﬃcients
are small, especially in comparison to the coeﬃcients on the same variables in the allowance
equation. The R2 shows that the covariates explain .02% of the variation in judge speciﬁc
allowance rates. Thus there is little evidence against the hypothesis of random assignment.
Random assignment satisﬁes the independence assumption described in section 4.1. The next
section provides some evidence on whether the rank and monotonicity conditions hold.
6.2 First Stage Estimates
Column 1 of table 2 shows the number of observations for diﬀerent groups of DI cases
heard by an ALJ. Column 2 shows the allowance rate at the ALJ stage for that group.
Column 3 shows the allowance rate of the group three years after assignment to an ALJ.
Columns 2 and 3 show that older individuals and high earners have relatively high allowance
rates. Nevertheless, diﬀerences in allowance rates across subgroups are small.
Column 4 shows the estimated ﬁrst stage regression coeﬃcient ˆ θ on the judge allowance
diﬀerential from equation (4). Column 5 shows the standard error and column 6 the t-
statistic. Column 4 shows that the probability of allowance is increasing in the judge allowance
diﬀerential and column 5 shows that the increase is highly statistically signiﬁcant for all the
subgroups we consider. The estimated value of ˆ θ for the full sample is .764, meaning that
the probability that case i is allowed rises .764% for every 1% increase in the judge allowance
diﬀerential (which measures the allowance rate on all cases other than case i). The main
reason ˆ θ is less than 1 is because we use allowance by the ALJ as the measure of the judge
allowance diﬀerential in table 1, whereas we use allowance three years after assignment as
17our key measure of allowance in table 2. Many cases denied by an ALJ are later allowed.
An important implication of the monotonicity assumption described in section 4.1 is
that the probability of allowance is non-decreasing in the judge allowance diﬀerential for
all subgroups of the population. If the allowance rate was rising in the judge allowance
diﬀerential for some subgroups of the population, but was declining for others, it would show
that lenient judges were less likely to allow beneﬁts than strict judges for some types of cases.
We do not observe this and thus cannot reject an important implication of the monotonicity
assumption. Furthermore, estimates are highly signiﬁcant, so the rank conditions hold.
6.3 Second Stage: the Eﬀect of Disability Recipiency on Labor Supply
Estimation  Demean Demean
procedure Allowed Denied Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
OLS 1442 5345 -3903 37 -3857 34 -4247 65
IV -4059 140 -4023 127
OLS 0.130 0.395 -0.265 0.002 -0.262 0.002 -0.271 0.002
IV -0.256 0.006 -0.255 0.005
Notes: N=1,779,825.  Covariates include all variables described in Table 1 
Earnings, participation, and allowance are measured 3 years after assignment to a judge
For de-meaned difference, all variables are de-meaned from the hearing office-day average  
Instrument is judge allowance differential





Table 3 presents estimates of the eﬀect of disability recipiency on earnings and labor force
participation using both OLS and IV estimators. The ﬁrst two columns show mean earnings
and labor force participation (measured as earnings > $100) for those allowed and denied
beneﬁts, three years after assignment to an ALJ. Column 3 shows the diﬀerence and column
4 the associated standard error. Columns 5 and 6 show OLS and IV estimates of de-meaned
(by hearing oﬃce and day) earnings on similarly de-meaned allowance. The IV estimate is
the estimate from equation (3). The next column includes the covariates listed in table 1.
Parameter estimates are remarkably similar whether using IV or OLS, and whether using
additional covariates or not.
18Our preferred results are the IV estimates with no covariates. These estimates suggest
that those who are allowed beneﬁts earn on average $4,059 per year less than their denied
counterparts. IV estimated participation rates for allowed individuals are 25.6% lower than
for their denied counterparts. Adding all the covariates listed in table 1 to this speciﬁcation
has only a tiny eﬀect on the estimates. Recall that our estimation procedure should deliver
consistent estimates, with or without covariates. Thus the fact that adding covariates does
not change the estimates is reassuring.
Table 4 disaggregates the participation responses by demographics, earnings, and health
conditions. Column 1 reports mean earnings for allowed individuals, column 2 for denied
individuals, column 3 the diﬀerence, and column 4 the standard error. Column 5 reports the
IV estimate of allowance on earnings and column 6 the standard error. Table 4 shows that
the eﬀect of DI allowance on participation is relatively small for college graduates and those
with neoplasms (mostly cancer), mental disorders, and mental retardation, but is larger for
high school graduates and those with diabetes. Participation responses are larger in the late
1990s than the early 1990s and early 2000s (recall that participation is measured three years
after assignment, so assignment in 1999 refers to participation in 2002), potentially giving
evidence that the work disincentive from DI is larger when it is easier to get a job. For most
groups, the OLS estimates are very close to the IV estimates. One interesting exception
is those with mental disorders. OLS estimates suggest decline in participation of 30.2% in
response to allowance, whereas IV suggests a decline of only 19.4%. The low responsiveness
of labor supply of those with mental illness is particularly surprising. Mental health is more
diﬃcult to monitor than many other health conditions. As a result, some analysts believe
that many who claim mental illness are those who are healthy and would have worked in the
absence of beneﬁt allowance (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). This turns out not to be the
case.
Table 5 disaggregates the earnings responses by demographics, earnings, and health con-
ditions. Results from this table are consistent with the results in table 4. For all groups,
allowance reduces participation. Earnings estimates tend to be less precise than estimates
for participation, however.
19Allowed Denied Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
All groups 0.130 0.395 -0.265 0.002 -0.256 0.006
Male 0.133 0.403 -0.270 0.002 -0.263 0.009
Female 0.127 0.386 -0.260 0.002 -0.250 0.008
45 or younger 0.174 0.467 -0.293 0.002 -0.290 0.009
45 to 54 0.116 0.359 -0.244 0.002 -0.254 0.009
55 to 59 0.094 0.282 -0.189 0.003 -0.248 0.019
60 to 64 0.099 0.179 -0.080 0.003 -0.069 0.023
Black 0.138 0.425 -0.287 0.003 -0.252 0.014
White 0.133 0.393 -0.260 0.002 -0.265 0.008
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 0.097 0.343 -0.246 0.004 -0.221 0.016
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2<70% 0.065 0.264 -0.199 0.002 -0.176 0.009
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2
￿70% 0.165 0.531 -0.365 0.002 -0.327 0.012
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)<$10000 0.087 0.325 -0.239 0.002 -0.202 0.008
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)
￿$10000 0.169 0.525 -0.356 0.002 -0.335 0.014
Represented by lawyer 0.130 0.400 -0.270 0.002 -0.274 0.008
Not represented by lawyer 0.129 0.389 -0.260 0.002 -0.226 0.010
SSDI 0.175 0.429 -0.254 0.002 -0.277 0.016
SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent 0.100 0.380 -0.280 0.002 -0.244 0.008
Less than high school 0.076 0.327 -0.251 0.002 -0.230 0.009
High school graduate, no college 0.148 0.425 -0.277 0.002 -0.279 0.009
Some college 0.210 0.479 -0.269 0.003 -0.261 0.019
College graduate 0.254 0.472 -0.219 0.004 -0.179 0.031
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 0.128 0.365 -0.237 0.003 -0.211 0.015
Mental disorders 0.155 0.457 -0.302 0.006 -0.194 0.043
Mental retardation 0.146 0.383 -0.237 0.003 -0.202 0.016
Nervous system 0.094 0.322 -0.227 0.007 -0.282 0.048
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease)  0.140 0.392 -0.251 0.004 -0.237 0.027
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.111 0.367 -0.256 0.003 -0.250 0.018
Respiratory system 0.136 0.419 -0.283 0.002 -0.285 0.009
Injuries  0.089 0.363 -0.274 0.004 -0.254 0.023
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.147 0.468 -0.320 0.003 -0.367 0.022
All other 0.089 0.324 -0.235 0.004 -0.224 0.024
1990 0.100 0.323 -0.223 0.004 -0.234 0.023
1991 0.108 0.332 -0.224 0.004 -0.186 0.021
1992 0.115 0.362 -0.247 0.004 -0.277 0.020
1993 0.123 0.370 -0.246 0.004 -0.231 0.018
1994 0.137 0.395 -0.259 0.004 -0.293 0.015
1995 0.142 0.410 -0.268 0.003 -0.276 0.015
1996 0.141 0.431 -0.289 0.003 -0.273 0.014
1997 0.147 0.424 -0.277 0.003 -0.252 0.013
1998 0.140 0.410 -0.270 0.003 -0.265 0.014
1999 0.134 0.386 -0.252 0.003 -0.222 0.017
Notes: OLS estimates are in levels with no covariates
IV estimates use demeaned variables and the judge allowance differential as the instrument
Allowance and participation measured 3 years after assignment to an ALJ
TABLE 4: ESTIMATED EFFECT OF DI RECIPIENCY ON PARTICIPATION, DISAGGREGATED
OLS IV









Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
20Allowed Denied Difference Std. Error Difference Std. Error
All groups 1442 5345 -3903 37 -4059 140
Male 1731 6231 -4500 48 -4695 234
Female 1153 4405 -3252 36 -3438 174
45 or younger 2085 6251 -4166 46 -4698 228
45 to 54 1286 5026 -3740 45 -4038 205
55 to 59 872 3728 -2855 69 -3218 427
60 to 64 747 1773 -1026 59 -1496 460
Black 1193 5175 -3982 48 -3675 249
White 1581 5637 -4056 44 -4383 197
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 1100 4431 -3331 67 -3143 381
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2<70% 521 2654 -2132 24 -2025 171
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2
￿70% 1937 8124 -6186 51 -5847 287
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)<$10000 578 3025 -2448 23 -2134 165
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006)
￿$10000 2227 9661 -7434 66 -6888 370
Represented by lawyer 1461 5474 -4013 41 -4431 190
Not represented by lawyer 1402 5189 -3787 47 -3459 239
SSDI 2341 7649 -5307 70 -5787 418
SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent 840 4337 -3497 34 -3138 168
Less than high school 638 3798 -3160 37 -3086 202
High school graduate, no college 1584 5889 -4305 44 -4750 207
Some college 2577 6953 -4375 74 -4077 479
College graduate 4478 9245 -4767 187 -4368 1272
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 1411 4850 -3439 59 -3634 344
Mental disorders 2332 6751 -4420 179 -2038 1323
Mental retardation 1350 4607 -3257 57 -2844 318
Nervous system 545 3120 -2575 107 -2920 1079
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease)  1501 5425 -3924 95 -3926 723
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 1178 4823 -3645 67 -3294 385
Respiratory system 1619 5974 -4355 50 -4942 245
Injuries  774 4377 -3603 94 -3177 477
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 2070 7178 -5108 94 -6606 578
All other 741 3727 -2986 77 -2589 437
1990 851 4208 -3357 93 -2848 516
1991 1078 4374 -3296 99 -3360 650
1992 1154 4692 -3538 88 -4205 418
1993 1213 4460 -3247 76 -4017 318
1994 1444 4803 -3359 67 -3748 350
1995 1661 5415 -3754 70 -4317 357
1996 1716 5976 -4260 68 -4366 348
1997 1773 6016 -4243 71 -3766 316
1998 1704 5991 -4287 71 -4745 326
1999 1566 5555 -3989 71 -4078 367
Notes: OLS estimates are in levels with no covariates
IV estimates use demeaned variables and the judge allowance differential as the instrument
Allowance and earnings measured 3 years after assignment to an ALJ
Represented by lawyer
IV
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Year assigned to judge
216.4 Dynamics of the Response
Figure 2 shows the earnings and participation responses to beneﬁt allowance. The top
left panel shows annual earnings for those who are allowed and those who are denied DI
beneﬁts both before and after the date of assignment to a judge. Prior to assignment, those
who are allowed beneﬁts have higher earnings than their denied counterparts. By the year
of assignment, earnings for allowed and denied individuals are similar. Three years after
assignment, earnings of those allowed beneﬁts average $1,490 while earnings of those denied
average $3,842, a diﬀerence of $2,352. Diﬀerences in earnings between those allowed and
those denied emerge rapidly, are very stable 2-5 years after assignment, and decline slowly
thereafter.8
Consistent with the evidence on earnings, the bottom-left panel of ﬁgure 2 shows that
10 years prior to assignment, those who are subsequently allowed beneﬁts have participation
rates that are seven percentage points higher than those subsequently denied beneﬁts. Three
years after the date of assignment, those who are allowed beneﬁts have participation rates
that are 17 percentage points lower than those who are denied. Afterwards, the diﬀerences
between the two groups narrow slightly.
The right-hand panels show IV estimates of earnings and labor force participation of
allowed and denied individuals both before and after assignment to a judge. We estimate the
eﬀect of allowance for each year relative to the assignment year, as predicted by the judge
allowance diﬀerential. We then infer the level of labor supply using the approach described
in section 4.4. Earnings and participation rates of the two groups are virtually identical
before assignment to a judge, which is unsurprising given that our instrument is uncorrelated
with earnings prior to assignment. However, after assignment, earnings and participation of
allowed individuals are lower. The top right panel shows that three years after the time of
assignment, the diﬀerence in earnings between the two groups is $2,314 (virtually identical to
the OLS estimate) and remains very stable thereafter. Similarly, the bottom right panel shows
that three years after assignment the diﬀerence in participation between the two groups is
14.8%, and does not change much thereafter. The standard errors are tiny and thus omitted.
For example, the standard error on the eﬀect of allowance on participation averages less than
8Some care must be taken in interpreting the decline in earnings of denied individuals 5 years after assign-
ment because after 5 years, 7% of all sample members are at least 65 and after 10 years 21% are at least 65.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of earnings and participation, allowed versus denied by ALJ.
1% when using either OLS or IV.
Note that the IV estimate of the eﬀect of allowance on earnings 3 years after allowance
is smaller in ﬁgure 2 ($2,314) than in table 3 ($4,059). The diﬀerence arises because ﬁgure
2 uses allowance by the ALJ, whereas table 3 uses allowance 3 years after assignment to the
ALJ. Section 6.5 discusses the diﬀerence between allowance by an ALJ and allowance at any
point in time.
6.5 Appeals, Re-applications, and Subsequent Allowance
The left panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the share of denied (at the ALJ stage) individuals who
are reapplying/appealing and allowed relative to when they are assigned to a judge.9 It
9We use data from ACAPS and LOTS to identify denied applicants who successfully appealed at either
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Probability of allowance or appeal/re−application, conditional on denial by ALJ
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Figure 3: Allowance and Appeals/Re-applications following denial by ALJ.
shows that 35% of all applicants denied by an ALJ were allowed beneﬁts within three years.
Furthermore, many initially denied individuals continue to reapply or appeal for many years
after their initial denial. Three years after assignment to an ALJ, 40% of all individuals
denied beneﬁts are still in the process of appealing or reapplying for beneﬁts. Because most
denied applicants have either been allowed beneﬁts or have given up applying for beneﬁts by
this point, we focus on allowance rates and labor supply decisions three years after assignment
to a judge in this paper.
The right panel of ﬁgure 3 presents the share of initially denied individuals who are allowed
beneﬁts or are still in the process of reapplying/appealing relative to when they are assigned
to a judge, where the shares are instrumented using the judge allowance diﬀerential.10 Thus
Record), and SSR (Supplemental Security Record) to identify denied applicants who reapplied for beneﬁts
and were allowed at either the DDS, Reconsideration, ALJ, Appeals, or Federal Court level stage.
10Using the set of individuals who were denied by an ALJ, we regress de-meaned allowance on a set of wave
dummies and predicted de-meaned ALJ allowance × wave dummies (where allowance is predicted using the
judge allowance diﬀerential). The estimated coeﬃcient on allowance×wave measures increased probability
of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial denial. Next, we regress de-meaned appeal on a set of
wave dummies and predicted de-meaned ALJ allowance interacted with wave dummies (where allowance is
predicted using the judge allowance diﬀerential). The estimated coeﬃcient on allowance×wave measures
24the left panel uses OLS and the right panel uses IV, where initial denial is instrumented using
the judge allowance diﬀerential. Those aﬀected by the instrument are likely the marginal cases
who have a better chance of ﬁnal allowance than others denied beneﬁts. For this reason we
might think that subsequent allowance rates of those initially denied would be higher when
instrumented. In fact, this is the case, although the OLS estimates and the IV estimates are
similar. For example, the right panel ﬁgure 3 shows that for those initially denied beneﬁts,
the IV estimate of allowance is 42% three years after assignment, versus 35% from the OLS
estimates.
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 show that most denied applicants do not work, but engage in re-
applications and appeals until they get DI beneﬁts. This has an important eﬀect on our main
estimated eﬀects. Table 3 shows that DI beneﬁt allowance reduces earnings $4,059 per year
when measuring earnings and allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ. However, DI
beneﬁt allowance reduces earnings $4,915 per year when measuring earnings and allowance
ﬁve years after assignment to an ALJ.
6.6 Estimates of the Distribution of Labor Supply, Allowance, and Appeal
Responses: Marginal Treatment Eﬀects
Using the the Marginal Treatment Eﬀects approach described in section 4.3 and appendix
C, this section shows how DI beneﬁt allowance aﬀects the distribution of labor supply, sub-
sequent allowance, and appeals.
The left panel of ﬁgure 4 shows the earnings decline and the right panel shows the partic-
ipation decline of the marginal case when allowed (i.e., the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect). We
use third order polynomials for both the instrument and the endogenous variable (de-meaned
allowance) when estimating equations (5) and (6). Both Akaike’s information criterion and
the Bayesian information criterion reject quadratic and quartic speciﬁcations in favor of the
cubic. Furthermore, results from the quartic speciﬁcation are very similar to the cubic speciﬁ-
cation. Since polynomial smoothers have poor endpoint properties, we show estimated MTEs
over the middle 90% of the distribution of the judge allowance diﬀerential. Based upon Monte
Carlo experiments, we found our procedure produced little bias over the middle 90% of the
distribution. Figure 4 also shows bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence intervals.
increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial denial. The right panel of ﬁgure 3
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Estimated Marginal Treatment Effect MTE, plus 2 SE MTE, minus 2 SE
Figure 4: Earnings and participation decline when allowed for marginal appli-
cant.
On average, annual earnings and participation decline $4,300 and 26% in response to
beneﬁt allowance, similar to the main estimates reported in table 3. However, there is het-
erogeneity in the declines. The earnings decline is $3,451 for the marginal applicant heard
by an ALJ who is stricter than 95% of all judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates
that are nine percentage points below the average three years after assignment. The earnings
decline is $4,131 for the marginal applicant heard by an ALJ who is more lenient than 95% of
all judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates that are eight percentage points above the
average three years after assignment. When allowance rates rise, the labor supply response of
the marginal case also rises. This result is consistent with the notion that as allowance rates
rise, more healthy individuals are allowed beneﬁts. These healthier individuals are more likely
to work when not receiving DI beneﬁts and thus their labor supply response to DI receipt is
greater. Nevertheless, the diﬀerences in the earnings response are not statistically signiﬁcant
and is modest in size.
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Figure 5: Probability of allowance and appeal 10 years after assignment to
and ALJ for marginal applicant.
appeal 10 years afterwards. The left panel shows that allowance three years after assignment
to an ALJ increases the probability of allowance 10 years after assignment by .60 on average.
Put diﬀerently, 40% of those not allowed three years after assignment were allowed beneﬁts
10 years after assignment. For marginal applicants assigned to lenient judges and are not
allowed three years after assignment, the probability of allowance 10 years after assignment
is (1-.62)=.38. For those assigned to strict ones it is (1-.58)=.42. The right panel of ﬁgure 5
shows that allowance three years after assignment reduces the average probability of appealing
10 years after assignment by .13, so 13% of those not allowed three years after assignment are
still appealing 10 years after assignment. For marginal applicants assigned to lenient judges
it is 15% and for those assigned to strict judges it is 11%. Figure 5 shows that for a marginal
applicant not allowed three years after assignment to a lenient judge, the probability that
she is either allowed beneﬁts or appeals 10 years after assignment is .38 and .15, respectively.
Thus conditional on not being allowed, 1-(.38+.15)=47% of those who do not get beneﬁts
and do not appeal or re-apply. For those assigned to the stricter judges, the numbers are
2742% for allowance, 11% for appealing, and 1-(.42+.11)=47% for not being allowed and not
appealing.
Recall that marginal applicants assigned to lenient judges and not allowed beneﬁts are
healthier than those assigned to strict judges. Thus it is unsurprising that they are less likely
to be allowed beneﬁts in the future. Nevertheless, the right panel of ﬁgure 5 shows that these
people continue trying to get the beneﬁt.
6.7 Elasticity of Labor Supply with Respect to the After-Tax Wage
In this section we present estimates of the eﬀect of DI on the after-tax (and after DI
beneﬁt) wage, as well as the earnings and participation elasticity with respect to the after-
tax wage. Table 6 shows participation and earnings elasticities with respect to the after-tax
wage, which we calculate as follows:
εy,w =
(E[yi|Ai = 0] − E[yi|Ai = 1])/(E[yi|Ai = 0] + E[yi|Ai = 1])
(E[wi|Ai = 0] − E[wi|Ai = 1])/(E[wi|Ai = 0] + E[wi|Ai = 1])
(12)
where E[yi|Ai = 0] is the average outcome variable (either mean earnings or participation) of
denied individuals and E[yi|Ai = 1] is the average outcome variable for allowed individuals.
E[wi|Ai = 0] is the average after-tax wage for denied individuals and E[wi|Ai = 1] is the
average after-tax wage for allowed individuals. The after-tax wage is deﬁned as the income
gain from wage earnings plus DI beneﬁts (net of federal, state and payroll taxes) when
working. Appendix B presents the details of how we estimate after-tax wages.
We ﬁrst predict the distribution of pre-tax wages for everyone in the sample. The ﬁrst
row of table 6 shows that the average predicted pre-tax wage of workers in our sample is
$11,047. Next, we use Social Security earnings histories, the year, and state of residence to
calculate DI/SSI beneﬁts for everyone in the sample. The second row shows that the average
DI/SSI beneﬁt is $9,023. The third row shows the DI/SSI beneﬁt reduction resulting from
high earnings. People who are allowed beneﬁts will lose most of their beneﬁts if they work.
The fourth column shows that the average Federal, State, and payroll tax paid by those
working is $2,081. The ﬁfth row is after-tax income, which is labor income plus the DI/SSI
beneﬁt, less DI/SSI reductions and taxes. The sixth row shows the average after-tax wage,
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the after-tax income if working and the after-tax income
if not working. The after-tax wage is $8,966 on average for those who are denied beneﬁts
28working not working working not working
Pre Tax Wage Income 11,047      0 11,047 0
DI/SSI benefit if Allowed 9,023        9,023 0 0
DI/SSI benefit reduction 4,367        0 0 0
Taxes 2,081        0 2,081
After Tax Income* 13,622      9,023 8,966 0
After Tax  Wage**
Earnings 1.83
Participation 1.51
Notes: Earnings and Participation estimates are from Table 3
Elasticity is an arc elasticity: see equation (12)
*After Tax Income is sum of pre-tax wage income and DI/SSI benefit, less DI/SSI benefit reduction and taxes




TABLE 6: EARNINGS AND PARTICIPATION ELASTICITIES
Means
Allowed versus 





and is $4,599 for those allowed beneﬁts. Because most DI beneﬁciaries who are working
earn above the SGA level, most people who are allowed beneﬁts will lose their DI beneﬁt
if they work. Thus, most of the gain from working is lost when the individual has been
allowed DI beneﬁts. We take estimates of earnings and participation declines when allowed
(i.e., E[yi|Ai = 0] − E[yi|Ai = 1]) from table 4 and use the procedure in section 4.4 to infer
E[yi|Ai = 1] and E[yi|Ai = 0]. Table 6 shows that the implied earnings elasticity is 1.8
and participation elasticity is 1.5. While our estimates suggest that most DI/SSI applicants
would not work even if denied beneﬁts, labor supply is elastic for this group of individuals.
In order to infer a labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage from the
labor supply response to DI allowance, we make two strong assumptions. First, we assume
that individuals are only responding to current work incentives and not future incentives.
However, individuals must keep their earnings below the SGA level in order to appeal or
reapply for beneﬁts. Therefore, the low earnings level of denied applicants may be caused
by the incentives to keep earnings low in order to appeal or to reapply for beneﬁts. Thus
we are overstating the percent diﬀerence in the present value of future after-tax wages and
understating the labor supply elasticity. To better assess this issue, we measure the labor
supply response to allowance ﬁve years after allowance. Figures 1 and 3 show that after ﬁve
years most DI/SSI applicants have either received beneﬁts or have given up on the application
29process. Five years after assignment to an ALJ, the participation elasticity is 1.6, slightly
higher than the elasticity three years after assignment.
Second, we omit the value of health insurance beneﬁts from both work and from DI/SSI
receipt. When individuals lose their DI and SSI beneﬁts due to high earnings, they also
typically lose their Medicare and Medicaid health insurance beneﬁts. Thus the percent change
in the after-tax wage is likely larger and the true labor supply elasticity is smaller than what
we report in table 6. As such, our two strong assumptions lead to two potentially important,
but oﬀsetting, biases.
7 Conclusion
This paper estimates the eﬀect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. Using
instrumental variables procedures, we address the fact that those allowed beneﬁts are a se-
lected sample. We ﬁnd that beneﬁt receipt reduces labor force participation by 26 percentage
points three years after a disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller
for those over age 55, college graduates, and those with mental illness. Over 60% of those de-
nied beneﬁts are allowed beneﬁts within 10 years. OLS estimates are similar to instrumental
variables estimates. The participation elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage is 1.5.
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32Appendix A: Data Appendix
We use the universe of all DI appeals heard by ALJs, 1990-1999. We use data from
the Oﬃce of Hearings and Appeals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing Oﬃce
Tracking System (HOTS), the Appeals Council Automated Processing System (ACAPS),
the Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS), the SSA 831 ﬁle, SSA Master Earnings
ﬁle (MEF), the Master Beneﬁciary Record (MBR), the Supplemental Security Record (SSR),
and the SSA Numerical Identiﬁcation (NUMIDENT) ﬁle.
The OHACCS data contain details of Social Security DI and SSI cases adjudicated at the
ALJ level (and also contain limited information on cases heard at the Appeals Council, Federal
or Supreme Court). In addition to SSI and DI, they include cases involving Retirement and
Survivors Insurance as well as Medicare Hospital insurance. We keep only the SSI and DI
cases. The OHACCS data are used for administering DI and SSI cases, and are thus very
accurate. The OHACCS data include information on the judge assigned to the case, the
hearing oﬃce, the date of assignment, and the outcome of the case (such as allowed or
denied). It also has data on the claimant’s Social Security number, and type of claim (DI
versus SSI). The data include all cases ﬁled in 1982 to present. Because our earnings data go
back to 1980, and we use earnings data 10 years prior to assignment, we use OHACCS data
1990-2009.
Until 2004, individual hearing oﬃces maintained their own data, called the Hearing Oﬃce
Tracking System (HOTS). These data were then uploaded to the OHACCS system. We found
some missing cases in the OHACCS system. These are apparently the result of HOTS data
not being properly uploaded. The problem occurs in about 1% of all cases. For these cases
we augment the OHACCS data with HOTS. After 2004, all uploading of data is automatic,
and thus there are no problems with missing data.
OHACCS also contains Appeals Council records. However, data on Appeals Council
decisions are sometimes missing from OHACCS. Thus we use the Appeals Council Automated
Processing System (ACAPS) data to track actions on cases heard at the Appeals Council level.
ACAPS is the Appeals Council’s data for administration of cases.
The Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS) data are used for administration of
cases that are heard at the Federal or Supreme Court level. These data provide information
on which cases that were denied at the Appeals Council level were appealed at the Federal
33Court level. We combine the LOTS data with information provided by the Federal Court to
determine whether the cases was eventually allowed or denied.
The SSA 831 data have information on the details of the DI application received at the
Disability Determination Service. The data include information on the type of application
(whether DI or SSI or concurrent) and whether the claim is on one’s own earnings history or
on the history of a spouse or parent. It also has all the information relevant for determining
whether the application should be allowed, either through a medical listing or the vocational
grid. Thus we have detailed medical information, such as the health condition of the indi-
vidual. Because of the vocational grid, we have information on age, education, industry and
occupation. We also have some other demographic information such as sex. Since a new 831
record is established whenever a new application is ﬁled and adjudicated, we use information
in the 831 ﬁle to identify those who reapplied for beneﬁts.
The Master Earning File (MEF) includes annual longitudinal earnings data for the US
population. It includes not only individuals’ annual Social Security covered earnings from
1951 to the present (which we use to calculate the Primary Insurance Amount for DI beneﬁts),
but also individuals’ annual wages directly taken from the W-2 starting from 1978. We use
data back to 1981. Wage earnings are not top-coded, but self-employment earnings are top
coded until 1992. Our earnings measure is the sum of wage earnings and self employment
earnings, which we topcode at $200,000 per year.
The Master Beneﬁciary Record (MBR) includes beneﬁciary and payment history data
for OASDI program. The Supplemental Security Record (SSR) contains information on
individuals applying for SSI beneﬁts. We use the MBR and SSR to identify disability beneﬁt
award status of individuals.
Lastly, we use the SSA NUMIDENT for information on date of death. The NUMIDENT
ﬁle includes information from the Social Security Number application form such as name,
date of birth and Social Security number. Once the individual dies, the date of death is
placed on the ﬁle. We treat individuals who die as missing, although we found that this
assumption does not aﬀect our results.
For Figure 1 and A1 we use all cases ﬁled 1989-1999. We include all primary disability –
auxiliary beneﬁt claimants (i.e., child and spouse) are excluded. We make no other sample
restrictions for these cases. For all other ﬁgures and tables, we begin with the universe of all
34cases adjudicated by an ALJ and make the following sample restrictions, described in Table
A1:
1. We drop all Medicare cases. These Medicare cases are typically disputes over whether
Medicare will pay for certain medical treatments.
2. We drop all remand cases (cases sent to Appeals Council, then sent back to the hearing
oﬃce). We drop these because this would lead to double counting of cases, as a remand
is a case that was already heard by an ALJ.
3. We drop cases with a missing Social Security number. This leaves us with 3,525,787
cases for 1990-1999.
4. We drop all cases younger than 35 or older than 64.
5. We drop cases with missing judge or hearing oﬃce information.
6. We drop cases that were previewed prior to being assigned to a judge. These cases are
extremely likely to be critical cases that are reviewed by a senior attorney.
7. We drop cases where the claim is against the earnings record of a spouse or parent.
8. We drop cases with missing education data. This leaves us with 1,779,825 cases.




(1): Age at assignment <35 or  >64  792,939
(2): Missing judge or hearing office information 174
(3): case is pre-viewed 794,470
(4): DI Child case 30,221
(5): Survivor case 3,564
(6): Missing education data 124,594
total number of sample dropped (sum of drops 1-6) 1,745,962
Remaining sample 1,779,825
TABLE A1: SAMPLE SELECTION
Reapplications and appeals
Figure A1 uses the same data as in ﬁgure 1 shows the total share of initial claims allowed
at any level. It also disaggregates those cases not allowed into those where the application
35Female 0.497
45 or younger 0.364
45 to 54 0.424
55 to 59 0.138
60 to 64 0.074
Black 0.234
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 0.118
Average participation rate, years -11 to -2 70% 0.922
Average earnings, years -11 to -2 ($2006) $10000 0.483
Not represented by lawyer 0.639
SSDI (not SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent) 0.378
Less than high school 0.408
High school graduate, no college 0.433
Some college 0.111
College graduate 0.048




Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease)  0.056
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.108
Respiratory system 0.360
Injuries  0.042












Allowance by ALJ 0.645
Allowance 3 years after assignment to an ALJ 0.769
Participation 3 years after assignment to an ALJ 0.191
Earnings 3 years after assignment to an ALJ 2345
N=1,779,825
TABLE A2: MEANS
Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Year assigned to judge
Age
Race
Labor force participation and income
Education
process ended versus those who were re-applying or appealing a denial. 10 years after the
initial ﬁling, 67% of all claimants were allowed beneﬁts, 27% were denied and the process
ended, and 6% were still in the process of applying for beneﬁts. Together, ﬁgures 1 and A1
emphasize the fact that re-applications and appeals are important for understanding the DI
system.
Appendix B: Calculation of the After-Tax Wage
We estimate after-tax wages as follows. We impute pre-tax wage income of non-working




























Figure A1: Share of all DI/SSI applicants who are allowed benefits, are
applying/appealing, and share who are denied, no longer re-applying or ap-
pealing
al. (1986). We ﬁrst regress income y on the vector of observable variables w described in
table 1, yielding y = wb + ϑ. Second, for each sample member i we calculate the predicted
value ˆ yi = wiˆ b, and for each member with an observed value of yi we calculate the residual
ˆ ϑi = yi − ˆ yi. Third, we sort the predicted value ˆ yi into deciles. Fourth, for non-working
individuals, we impute ϑi by ﬁnding a random individual j with a value of ˆ yj in the same
decile as ˆ yi, and setting ϑi = ˆ ϑj. The imputed value of yi is ˆ yi + ˆ ϑj. We estimate models
for DI and SSI beneﬁciaries separately because the two groups face diﬀerent labor supply
incentives.
Once we impute pre-tax wage income for every member of the sample, we calculate the
after-tax wage. First, we use year, state, and the Social Security earnings data to calculate
the DI/SSI beneﬁt for everyone in the sample. We impute SSI beneﬁts using state and year
for those drawing SSI beneﬁts. Second, we predict the distribution of post-tax wages plus
DI beneﬁts (i.e., the diﬀerence between income if working and income if not working) for
everyone in our data using the federal, state, and local tax schedule shown in French and
Jones (2011). Those who are allowed beneﬁts will have DI beneﬁts if predicted income from
working is below the SGA limit ($6,000 in 1993 to $9,360 in 2002). If income is above the
SGA limit, then the individual will lose beneﬁts. If the individual is denied beneﬁts, then
37there are no DI beneﬁts to be lost when working. We assume that SSI beneﬁts above the
disregard level are reduced 50 cents for each dollar of earnings, until all SSI beneﬁts are
lost. Third, we take the sample average after-tax wage if denied and allowed, which is our
measure of E[wi|Ai = 0] and E[wi|Ai = 1]. Our main limitation on these measurements is
that ideally we should know family structure and all sources of income to calculate taxes.
Family structure is important because the DI/SSI beneﬁt depends on marital status and the
number of dependants. Unfortunately, we do not have this information, so we assume that
the individual can claim no dependants for the DI/SSI beneﬁt and is not pushed into a higher
marginal tax bracket from spousal or other non-labor income.
Appendix C: Derivations
Marginal Treatment Eﬀects
All derivations in this are purely for completeness – they are straightforward adaptations
of that discussed in Heckman et al. (2006) or French and Taber (2010). Deﬁne Ai as a
0-1 indicator =1 if individual i is allowed beneﬁts, yi is either earnings or participation.





y1i if Ai = 1
y0i if Ai = 0
(13)
where
y1i = φ + XiδA + u1i (14)
y0i = XiδA + ui
Combining equations (13) and (14) yields:
yi = Aiφi + XiδA + ui. (15)
where φi = φ + u1i − ui. Allowance is determined by
Ai = 1{g(Zi) − Vi > 0} (16)
38where 1{.} is the indicator function, Zi = (ji,Xi), and ji represents a full set of judge
dummy variables. By assumption, ui and φi are potentially correlated with each other but
Vi is independent of ji and Xi. The Marginal Treatment Eﬀect is
MTE(Xi = x,Vi = p) ≡ E[y1i − y0i|Xi = x,Vi = p] (17)
where P(Zi) ≡ Pr(Ai = 1|Zi). Given equation (14), MTE(Xi = x,Vi = p) = φ+ u1i −u0i =
φi. Using equation (15), we estimate the conditional expectation function
E[yi|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] = E[Aiφi + XiδA + ui|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p]
= E[Ai(φ + u1i − ui)|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] + XiδA + E[ui|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p]
= E[Aiφ|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] + E[(u1i − ui)|Ai = 1,Xi = x,P(Zi) = p]p + XiδA
+E[ui|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] (18)
where the step E[Ai(u1i − ui)|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] = E[(u1i − ui)|Ai = 1,Xi = x,P(Zi) =
p]Pr[Ai = 1|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] follows from the Law of Total Probability, and noting that
Pr[Ai = 1|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] = p. Continuing with the simpliﬁcations, and noting that we
have already assumed that u1i,ui are independent of Xi we have:
E[yi|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p] = φp + E[(u1i − ui)|Ai = 1,P(Zi) = p] + XiδA + E[ui|P(Zi) = p]
= XiδA + φp + E[(u1i − ui)|Ai = 1,P(Zi) = p]p + E[ui|P(Zi) = p]
= XiδA + K(p) (19)
where K(p) ≡ φp + E[(u1i − ui)|Ai = 1,P(Zi) = p]p + E[ui|P(Zi) = p]. Diﬀerentiating
equation (19) with respect to p yields
∂E[yi|Xi = x,P(Zi) = p]
∂p
= K′(p) (20)
39This derivative is equal to the Marginal Treatment Eﬀect. To see this, note that as a nor-
malization we can let the distribution of Vi be uniform [0,1], so






0 E[y1i|Xi = x,Vi = p] +
  1
p E[y0i|Xi = x,Vi = p]
 
∂p
= E[y1i|Xi = x,Vi = p] − E[y0i|Xi = x,Vi = p]
≡ MTE(Xi = x,Vi = p). (21)
Thus estimation of equation (19) and taking K′(p) yields the MTE.
Demeaning the data
We have over 500,000 hearing oﬃce-day interactions as covariates, so directly estimating
equations (5) and (6) is not computationally feasible. To simplify the problem we de-mean
the data. Speciﬁcally, we take the diﬀerence between f(jiˆ γ1,−i), Ai, K( ˆ P(Zi)), and yi and
the means of the same variables heard at the same hearing oﬃce and same day.11 We then
estimate:
  Ai = ^ f(jiˆ γ1,−i) + η∗
i, (22)
  yi = ^ K( ˆ P(Zi)) +  ∗
i (23)
where “ ” represents a de-meaned variable, e.g.,   Ai = Ai − ¯ At and ¯ At is the mean allowance
rate at the hearing oﬃce and on the day that case i was assigned and   ji = ji− ¯ jt and ¯ jt is the
mean value of j at the hearing oﬃce and on the day that case i was assigned. For the functions




and K( ˆ Ai) =
 K
k=1 θk ˆ Ki
k
.
Polynomials are straightforward to demean, so ] f(ˆ ji) =
 K
k=1 φk
  ˆ ji
k
, where






t is demeaned value of the kth power of the judge-speciﬁc allowance rate of all judges
at the oﬃce where case i was heard) and ^ g( ˆ Ai) =
 K
k=1 θk
  ˆ At
k
, where







choose the order of polynomial K that minimizes Akaike’s information criterion, ln ˆ σ2+2K/N
and the Bayesian information criterion, ln( ˆ σ2) + K/N · ln(N). Because of the well known
endpoint problems with polynomials, we experimented with the order of the polynomial. We
11This is equivalent to taking residuals from ﬁrst stage regressions of f(jiˆ γ1,−i), Ai, K( ˆ P(Zi)), and yi on
Xi.
40found that the results were largely unchanged when we increased or decreased the order of
the polynomial by 1.
The instrument is jiˆ γ1 from the equation
Ai = jiˆ γ1 + Xiγ2 + ei (24)
implies
E[As|Xs] = E[jsˆ γ1|Xs] + Xsγ2 (25)
for any given s and so
E[jsˆ γ1 − E[jsˆ γ1|Xs]] = E[As − E[As|Xs]] (26)
where the left-hand side object is E[jsˆ γ1 − E[jsˆ γ1|Xs]], the de-meaned instrumental vari-
able. We approximate the right-hand side object, but using the sample analog and leaving
observation i out, as in a jackknife estimator, so the constructed instrument is:





As − As (27)
where Nj is the number of cases heard by judge ji over the sample period, {J} is the set
of cases heard by judge ji, As is the mean allowance rate at case s’s hearing oﬃce on the
day case s was heard. Doyle (2008) uses a similar approach. Because we remove case i from
^ jiˆ γ1,−i, as in a jackknife estimator, it should be independent of ηi and  i, even in a small
sample.
Based on Monte Carlo experiments with what seemed reasonable parameters, the proce-
dure produced accurate approximations in the linear models, as well as for the true MTE
from the 10th to 90th percentiles of the distribution of Vi, so we present estimates of the
MTE over the middle 80 percent of the data.
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